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Footnotes
Many of the ideas expressed in this article are explored in much
greater depth in my prior works, all of which are available at my Van-
derbilt Law School faculty website and on SSRN. See Terry A.
Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (2012); Emotional Reg-
ulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1485 (2011); and The Per-
sistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CAL. L. REV. 629
(2011). This article is by design lightly footnoted; I refer the inter-
ested reader to the extensive citations in those longer publications.
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68 (1921).
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sions, 49 CT. REV. 114 (2013). 
6. State v. Hutchinson, 271 A.2d 641, 644 (Md. 1970).
7. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia
Sotomayor, To Be an Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 13 (2009) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). See also
id. at 17 (statement of Sen. Lindsay Graham) (a judge’s most crit-
ical qualification is “the capacity to set aside one’s own feelings so
he or she can blindly and dispassionately administer equal justice
for all”).
8. John Yoo, Closing Arguments: Obama Needs a Neutral Justice, PHILA.
INQUIRER, May 10, 2009, at C3.
9. Peter Baker, In Court Nominees, Is Obama Looking for Empathy by
Another Name?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at A12.
10. Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings, at 71, 120 (statement of J.
Sonia Sotomayor). 
11. RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 226 (2001).
As a Supreme Court Justice once wrote, “dispassionatejudges” are “mythical beings,” like “Santa Claus orUncle Sam or Easter bunnies.”1 Judges have emotions,
and emotions influence decision making. These observations
may seem obvious, even banal. But their implications are
broad-reaching. Judicial emotion is more common than most
people—certainly laypeople, and perhaps judges as well—
would like to believe. Further, emotion almost certainly has a
substantial impact on judicial decision making and behavior—
and that is not necessarily a bad thing.
The ideal of the emotionless, “dispassionate” judge has a very
long pedigree. More than three centuries ago, Thomas Hobbes
wrote in Leviathan that the ideal judge is “divested of all fear,
anger, hatred, love, and compassion.”2 To a modern ear such a
blunt statement sounds, perhaps, antiquated. To the extent this
is so, it is because the Legal Realists of the early twentieth cen-
tury largely convinced us of the importance of the person wear-
ing the robe. Law is not certain, and judges have discretion,
within which space ostensibly “alogical” or “non-rational”
forces have room to operate.3 As the great Benjamin Cardozo
once mused, “Deep below consciousness are other forces, the
likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the
complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions,
which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge.”4
In our post-Realist world, such frank acknowledgment of
judges’ humanity is relatively commonplace. As other contri-
butions to this special issue make clear,5 judges are affected by
factors as diverse as fatigue and life experiences, and they
deploy common (but sometimes misleading) decision-making
shortcuts known as heuristics. Judges are likely no better than
ordinary humans at multitasking or truth-telling. An entire
academic cottage industry is devoted to ascertaining the deci-
sional influence of personal characteristics such as gender and
political party. 
But we still seldom talk about the emotional aspect of judges’
humanity. And when we do, we run into a fairly solid wall of
opposition. Judicial emotion generally is seen as an unfortunate
consequence of having to populate the legal system with falli-
ble, biased, real people. Indeed, emotion traditionally has been
counted among the primary sources of fallibility and bias. A
Maryland judge expressed this well: “Judges, being flesh and
blood, are subject to the same emotions and human frailties as
affect other members of the species.”6 The task of the legal sys-
tem, under this contemporary view, is to systematically reduce
the opportunities for judicial emotion to insert itself; the task of
the good judge is to prevent emotion from exerting any influ-
ence wherever such opportunities remain. 
We saw this view vividly articulated during the 2009 nomi-
nation of now-Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who some feared
would have an overly “empathic” judging style. One senator
implied that judges’ emotions posed a threat to liberty;7 a
prominent professor declared that a “compassionate, empa-
thetic judge was very likely to be a bad judge”;8 a journalist
noted that the mere suggestion that emotion might affect judg-
ing was “radioactive.”9 Even among Sotomayor’s supporters,
defense of empathy (or any emotional influence) was tepid at
best. She was finally able to put the issue to rest by offering a
standard post-Realist narrative: that while judges are not
“robots” and do have feelings, a good judge recognizes those
feelings and puts them aside.10
Certainly, judges are not robots, so the first half of that story
is correct. But what if the latter part is wrong? What if emo-
tion—at least sometimes—offers something of value to judicial
decision making? Judge Richard A. Posner has suggested as
much, writing that judges ought not try to become “emotion-
less, like computers,” because feelings might sometimes be
necessary to good judging.11 Justice William J. Brennan simi-
larly asserted that good judgment flows from a “dialogue of
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reason and passion.”12 If that is so, what might that dialogue
sound like?
These are questions that law need not—indeed, cannot—
answer on its own. A rich and fast-growing body of literature
on the role of emotion in human life offers insight and guid-
ance. Indeed, the study of emotion is one of the fastest-grow-
ing sectors within psychology and neuroscience. This explo-
sion in the “affective sciences” joins a resurgence of interest in
the topic within philosophy, history, and sociology. The con-
sensus from outside law is clear. Emotion’s impact on decision
making and behavior can be (and usually is) positive, even
indispensible. Emotion’s impact can also be detrimental,
depending on factors such as intensity, duration, and—most
critically—context. Drawing on these interdisciplinary
insights, we can think in a coherent way about when emotion
might help a judge perform her job better, when it might hin-
der job performance, and how a judge might tell the difference. 
This short article offers the judge a roadmap for thinking
about the role of emotion in judicial decision making. It first
presents the limited empirical evidence drawn from judges
themselves, demonstrating that coping with emotional chal-
lenges is an unrecognized aspect of judges’ work. It goes on to
describe what the affective sciences teach us about emotions’
impact on human decision making and behavior. To make the
discussion concrete, the article periodically applies those
insights to the phenomenon of judicial anger. Finally, an analy-
sis of emotional regulation strategies offers a concrete path by
which judges can learn to maximize helpful iterations of emo-
tion and minimize destructive ones.
COPING WITH EMOTIONAL CHALLENGES: AN UNDER-
APPRECIATED ASPECT OF JUDGING
Judges, particularly trial judges, often have to manage the
emotions of other people. Distraught victims and witnesses
have to be attended to; disruptive family members or criminal
defendants must be cautioned, disciplined, or removed; angry
disputes between lawyers need to be mediated or broken up.13
Judges are asked to filter out emotional influences, such as dis-
turbing evidence and provocative buttons or t-shirts worn by
spectators, if there is a risk that a jury’s emotions might be
manipulated or inflamed.14 Indeed, trial judges may be called
upon to instruct jurors about how to handle their emotions
during deliberations.15
While the legal system recognizes that handling the emo-
tions of others is part of a judge’s
job, it tends to ignore something
just as important: the fact that
judges, too, have emotions to
handle.16 Misbehaving lawyers
and litigants can make judges
angry. Disturbing evidence may
affect a judge as much as it does
a juror. The stories of litigants’
unhappy lives can trigger sad-
ness. Judges might feel frus-
trated, even depressed, when
they are unable to fix all the ills
paraded before them. As one has written, “[S]ometimes [the
judge] has to just sit up there and watch justice fail right in
front of him, right in his own courtroom, and he doesn’t know
what to do about it, and it makes him feel sad. . . . Sometimes
he even gets angry about it.”17 Litigation generally follows harm
or grievance, meaning that such unpleasant emotions are
nowhere in short supply. 
Fortunately, judges also experience more pleasant emotions.
They may feel joy when a suffering child is placed with a fam-
ily, or hope when a drug-court defendant completes treatment
and begins to turn his life around. Presiding over naturaliza-
tion ceremonies for new Americans is an occasion for grati-
tude, even a soaring feeling that psychologists call “eleva-
tion.”18 Crafting a tightly reasoned, well-written opinion can
generate pride. Simply feeling like you are doing a good job,
even under trying circumstances, can be a source of deep sat-
isfaction. The emotions a judge feels will be as varied as the
cases she hears.
Because our legal culture expects judicial “dispassion,”
however, judges do not often disclose their emotional reactions
or discuss how they process them. As that taboo breaks down,
we may see increased space for much-needed empirical work
exploring those issues. As things stand today, we must glean
clues from rare moments of candor. 
Those moments show that emotion infuses many aspects of
judges’ work. Judges sometimes note their emotions before
declaring an intention to override them.19 With the prolifera-
tion of cameras in courtrooms, coinciding with the growth of
social-media outlets, the public has developed an appetite for
intemperate displays, gleefully referred to as “benchslaps.” In
burial disputes, which often involve grisly details and vitriolic
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family dynamics, judges have
voiced the “dismay,” “sympa-
thy,” and “difficulties and
embarrassment” with which
they grapple.20 Recently, several
prominent federal judges have
disclosed that they find crimi-
nal sentencing to be particu-
larly infused with emotion.21
While trial-level work in the state criminal and family
courts may provide the steadiest flow of emotion-triggering sit-
uations, no judge is immune. Highly publicized instances of
intra-court animosity, including in the appellate courts, some-
times shine an unflattering light on the role of personal feel-
ings.22 Even the highly cloistered appellate environment of the
U.S. Supreme Court has an emotional life. Justice David Souter
reportedly cried during the process of deciding Bush v. Gore,23
and Justice Clarence Thomas, not known for public displays of
emotion, has said that “some cases . . . will drive you to your
knees.”24
Data from two small case studies further illuminate the real-
ity of judicial emotion. In the first, Australian magistrate
judges answered a survey about various aspects of their
work.25 Much like state trial-court judges in the U.S. system,
Australian magistrates handle the majority of civil and crimi-
nal actions. These judges reported expending significant effort
to manage their emotions, most of which were negative. One,
for example, characterized his work as “seeing absolute misery
passing in front of you day in, day out, month in, month out,
year in, year out.”26 Another reflected thus on working with
child-welfare cases:
I have a problem walking away and just erasing
everything I’ve heard about families and the stress that
they’re under, the treatment children have been dished
out, what will happen to them for the rest of their lives.
I just find it difficult to walk away from that and go
home to my own children and look at them and think
“Oh, God”, you know. I usually find I try to be more
patient with my own children when I go home after a
day in the [family court]. So it’s just the sadness; there is
no good news.27
Similar sentiments were expressed by a small group of Min-
nesota state judges asked to reflect on victim-impact state-
Data from two
small case studies
further illuminate
the reality of 
judicial emotion.
ments.28 The researchers described one response thus:
One judge . . . recalled a DWI case in which a
young child [had] almost lost his life. His mother deliv-
ered an impact statement in which she described how
she thought her son was going to die. “I remember
thinking,” the judge said, “I am going to cry.” But he
regained what he thought was necessary composure
because “you are not supposed to cry on the bench
when you are a judge.”29
Other Minnesota judges reported feeling frustration, anger,
and compassion, emotions prompted both by the underlying
facts and by the victim-impact statements. 
Importantly, both the Australian and Minnesotan judges
reported that they found the work of regulating their emotions
to be difficult. One magistrate offered a particularly stark
assessment:
Now, there’s two things that can happen to you. Either
you’re going to remain a decent person and become ter-
ribly upset by it all because your emotions—because
your feelings are being pricked by all of this constantly or
you’re going to become—you’re going to grow a skin on
you as thick as a rhino, in which case I believe you’re
going to become an inadequate judicial officer because
once you lose the human—the feeling for humanity you
can’t really—I don’t believe you can do the job.30
This perception of nothing but bad options was, unfortu-
nately, echoed by the Minnesota judges. Some reported feeling
that, as the legal system tends “to strip away emotions,” they
were “working in a factory of sorts in which we are just grind-
ing these cases out,” causing them to worry that they were
becoming “insulated and numb” in the process.31
These windows into judges’ experience suggest that their
work often prompts an emotional response; that such
responses are often unpleasant; that managing those emotions
is difficult; and that these challenges have an impact on how
the judge acts in the moment and on how she feels about her
work in the longer term. These voices also strongly suggest
that judges feel inadequately trained and supported in this
aspect of their work. 
Fortunately, insights from the affective sciences can help
change this rather bleak assessment.
Thus, emotion embodies
thought, often complex and
even culturally scripted thought,
and those thoughts can be evalu-
ated just like any others.34
Again, the example of anger is
helpful. Whether we approve or
disapprove of an angry person
depends on whether we think
her perception of the triggering
event is accurate—that is,
whether the event really
occurred as she believes it did—
and whether her judgments strike us as warranted—that is,
whether the event really constitutes a wrong of which a person
rightfully should disapprove. 
Thus, emotion reveals what a person is thinking. It reveals
her reasons.
Emotion motivates action in service of reasons. Emotions
do not simply reflect passive assessment of what we perceive to
be happening in the world; they prompt us to respond to that
world. The idea in the sciences is that we evolved capacity for
emotion in order to maximize survival chances, and we now
use that capacity to propel us in the direction of a wider vari-
ety of goals. Fear provides a nice example. If you perceive that
a grizzly bear is approaching, your perceptions and resulting
thoughts will spur fear. Fear will focus your attention on the
bear and prompt you to evaluate its relevance to your goals—
for example, the desire not to be mauled or killed. Fear then
enables responsive action, including patterns of bodily
response (like fleeing), as well as typified facial expressions
(grimacing) and verbalizations (screaming) that signal your
emotional state to others. This is a rather primal example, but
the same principle holds for all emotions. Feeling love toward
an infant, for example, tends to motivate actions designed to
keep the baby alive and thriving, and feeling guilty about hav-
ing wronged a friend tends to show itself in a pained face,
which can communicate a desire to repair the relationship. 
Thus, emotion not only reflects thoughts; it serves as an
adaptive signal that something of import to a person’s flour-
ishing is at stake and activates a real-time response.
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2003); HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS (Michael Lewis & Jeannette M.
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tions,” for they are “states that one can regard as rationally war-
ranted or unwarranted, justified or unjustified by the circum-
stances in which they occur or the beliefs on which they are
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EMOTION AND DECISION MAKING: INSIGHTS FROM
PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE32
The first insight the legal system would do well to internal-
ize is that we need not ask judges to “strip away” their emo-
tions, because those emotions offer something of value.
Contemporary scholarship outside of law has generated a
consensus that emotion is an evolved, adaptive mechanism, nec-
essary for survival, social cohesion, and practical reason. This
consensus is rapidly eroding the stark division between reason
and emotion that traditionally has held sway in both the sci-
ences and in law. As I explain briefly below, emotion reveals rea-
sons, motivates action in service of reasons, and enables reason. 
Emotion reveals reasons. This insight flows from what psy-
chologists refer to as the “cognitive-appraisal” theory. This the-
ory focuses on the “aboutness” of any given emotion. Emo-
tions are not random; rather, they are directed at objects. We
love our mothers, for instance, and the specificity of that love
is how we experience the concept of “love.” Further, every
emotion has a basic underlying thought and belief structure—
an “appraisal”—which is an important way in which we dis-
tinguish them from one another. Anger, for example, reflects a
judgment that someone has wrongly threatened or damaged
something or someone that we value. In contrast, we feel sad
when we perceive an irreversible loss, or guilty when we per-
ceive ourselves to have done wrong. 
It is helpful to think of appraisal structure as akin to the the-
ory of universal grammar. Human language is built of a rela-
tively constrained set of grammatical elements—nouns versus
verbs, function versus lexical words, and so on—but different
cultures fill in different content, making our languages dis-
tinct. Similarly, all humans appear to have a common core of
basic emotions underlain by highly similar appraisal struc-
tures, but how we fill in those structures can vary. What makes
one person afraid might make another person happy. This is
not because these two people have radically different concepts
of fear and happiness; rather, they have radically different ideas
as to what states of the world satisfy the conditions that trigger
those emotions.33 In the case of anger, what constitutes a per-
ceived wrong will vary; who we consider part of the group on
whose behalf it is right to be angry will vary; even the proper
goal to be advanced by anger—for example, vindicating honor
or broadcasting moral judgment—will vary. 
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Emotion enables reason.
Finally, one of the most cutting-
edge implications of modern
research is that emotion and
reason are intertwined, such
that the latter can’t fully be real-
ized without the former. Neuro-
science, for example, has
shown that people with particu-
lar sorts of brain disease and
injury show a decline in both
emotional capacity and sub-
stantive rationality.35 Extreme
emotional deficits in such people are strongly correlated with
inability to engage in vital forms of reasoning—evidenced, for
example, by inability to make appropriate, self-interested
choices in a simple gambling task. They become unable to sup-
press inappropriate actions, to understand and respond to
social cues, and to advance their own interests and preferences.
In other words, social and emotional competence can be dev-
astated while more purely cognitive capacities, like logic,
remain intact. 
Emotion also appears necessary to moral judgment. A cre-
ative series of experiments involving the classic philosophical
“trolley problem” illustrate that phenomenon.36 In the trolley
problem people are asked to choose between two options. The
first is to flip a switch to divert an out-of-control trolley, killing
a worker on the diversion track but saving five people in its
original path. The second option is to push a human being off
a bridge so that he lands in front of the trolley, saving the five
but killing him. In either case the cold calculation is the same:
save five lives by sacrificing one. Most normal people, though,
think option one is moral, even necessary, while option two is
immoral. The differential? Emotion. The heightened emotional
salience of person-pushing accounts for an overwhelming pref-
erence for switch-flipping. Psychopathy provides another
example of emotion’s relevance to morality. The antisocial and
amoral behavior typifying serial murderers and other psy-
chopaths correlates at the neural level with a lack of normal
emotional response.37 Psychopaths’ moral indifference mirrors
their emotional indifference.
In short, emotion is not the enemy of reason. They are inter-
dependent. Not only does reason facilitate and shape emotion,
but each plays a vital role in our ability competently to navi-
gate the world, including our capacity for substantive rational-
ity and moral judgment. This is as true for judges as it is for
human beings generally. 
Emotion is not always a positive force. The prior discussion
has highlighted the overall positive contribution of emotion.
Given the generally negative narrative we have inherited in our
legal culture, it is important to spell out the parameters of that
contribution. But, of course, the negative narrative has to have
some truth to it. 
Indeed, it often has a lot of truth to it. Another insight from
the sciences is that all human tendencies and capacities that
are adaptive most of the time are maladaptive some of the time.
The common decisional heuristics described elsewhere in this
special issue fit into that category: quick, efficient guides to
judgment that work quite well in many situations but pre-
dictably lead to error in a small set of others. This is certainly
true of emotion.38
By way of illustration, recall the story of the approaching
grizzly bear. Fear quickly narrows attention to sources of threat
(the bear) and opportunity (escape routes), to the exclusion of
other stimuli. That attentional effect is vital, but it has costs.
For example, you will be far less able to perceive and remem-
ber less emotionally vivid aspects of the situation, like an
important conversation you were having just before you saw
the bear. The emotion needs to be intense to do its job, but as
a result you might not notice the ditch standing between you
and the escape route. 
Similarly, different emotionally infused mood states tend to
dispose us to different decisional styles, which might be disad-
vantageous in particular situations. Moods are experiential
states that are more generalized, longer-lasting, and less object-
driven than emotions: think of the difference between feeling
“down” and being concretely sad about the death of a beloved
pet. Because emotions and moods are so closely related,
though, they often are studied together. Often what starts as a
discrete emotion will morph into a mood (you are sad that
your dog died, and it makes you feel down for a long time for
no particular reason), or our moods predispose us to experi-
ence discrete emotions (you feel down, so you find more
things to be sad about). Moods, unfortunately, can be mis-
matched with the decisional demands we face at any given
moment. This, too, is a nice insight raised elsewhere in this
special issue, in which it is noted that certain moods “are best
suited for decision-making tasks that are interesting or require
creativity or efficiency,” while others are “best suited for deci-
sion tasks that are effortful and/or require careful consideration
and analysis.”39 In an example of particular relevance to
judges, people in sad moods tend to scrutinize evidence more
carefully than do happy or angry people, meaning that happi-
ness, anger, and their associated moods can sometimes con-
tribute to blind spots. This is why Judge Posner once warned
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that we ought to “beware the happy or the angry judge!”40
Finally, very intense emotion can sometimes lead us astray
and even defeat our goals. Fear can paralyze; sadness can over-
whelm; love can blind. This reality is so evident from our lives
that it needs no further comment here.
A full understanding of emotion’s impact, then, requires us
to consider both what it offers and what it might take away. Rec-
ognizing emotion’s value is critical, given how thoroughly we’ve
disparaged it to date. That does not mean we should give it free
rein. The capacity to regulate emotion is a skill every bit as crit-
ical as is the capacity to feel emotion. 
THE PLUSES AND MINUSES OF EMOTION FOR JUDGES
These fundamental understandings about the nature and
function of emotion clearly matter to judges as people. An emo-
tionally well-adjusted judge is likely to have better physical
health, happier work-life balance, and more functional personal
relationships. Like caring for the body, caring for emotional
health helps us achieve more satisfying lives.
The remainder of this article, though, focuses how these
insights affect judges as judges—that is, in the concrete context
of judicial work settings. After extending the prior discussion to
judicial emotion, using anger as the primary example,41 the arti-
cle goes on to explain how judges can most effectively regulate
the emotions they are bound to have. 
First, one benefit of an emotion for judges is that it signals
seriousness, both internally and externally. Consider anger.
Angering events are vivid, which sends a signal that something
important is happening. Whereas some emotions have a strong
withdrawal tendency—for example, disgust makes us back
away—anger keeps us engaged, meaning that it focuses the
judge’s attention to the offending person and situation. Anger
also communicates seriousness to others. Its typical physical
manifestations—raised voice, clenched eyebrows, narrowed eyes,
a scowl, and tensed muscles—are extraordinarily potent commu-
nicative devices. Anger conveys power. Thus, the emotion sends
important signals both to the judge and from the judge.
Second, anger motivates us to assign blame and conse-
quences. It is tightly bound up with an urge to restore justice.
Further, anger makes us more willing to take risks, in part
because it is associated with optimism and feelings of being in
control. Indeed, experimental studies show that people prefer
being in an angry state when faced with a confrontational task,
because anger helps them take on and succeed at the con-
frontation. It also literally heats us up, to prepare the body and
mind for action—think of that telltale “boiling” feeling. Thus,
anger facilitates both judgment and action.
These attributes are of obvious utility to judges—indeed, one
is tempted to say they are necessary, or even that anger is quin-
tessentially judicial. A judge often is asked to assign blame and
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consequences, which anger can
help her do. It can also help her
take necessary risks. Judges
sometimes have to alienate
powerful interests, upset poten-
tial voters, disappoint decent
people who have been wronged,
and even jeopardize public
safety. The late Judge John
Sprizzo of the Southern District
of New York, for example, once
expressed fury at having to
release high-level drug dealers because of fatal flaws in the
indictment.42 Similarly, some judges reported recently that
they hesitated in sanctioning police officers who had commit-
ted blatant perjury, citing a fear of ruining careers or conferring
an undeserved benefit on defendants. Anger at the officers’
abuse of the system helped them do what was right, not what
was easy.43
Anger can also keep the judge’s mind in the courtroom, so
to speak. Given the welter of stimuli and stressors to which
judges are exposed, they may need emotion to flag possible
misconduct, direct attention to it, and keep attention from sag-
ging. Moreover, anger’s expressive benefits are strategically
invaluable. Consider the difference between quietly suggesting
that a lawyer stop making improper objections despite
repeated instructions not to do so and smacking your hand on
the bench and using a sharp tone. 
Anger is not the only emotion that can serve judges well.
Expressions of sorrow, for example, may demonstrate respect
to present victims. A nice example from recent events: In a dis-
play remarkable enough to be extensively covered by the
media, a New York City trial judge presiding over the sentenc-
ing of a serial killer cried when pronouncing sentence.44 One
of the things that made this moment remarkable was that the
sentence made no practical difference; the defendant was
already serving multiple life terms in California. The judge’s
tears drove home its symbolic and emotional importance. The
victims’ families reported that those tears meant a lot to them:
they felt that their suffering had been acknowledged, turning a
proceeding that could have been painfully pro forma into one
that was meaningful. 
If the tears-at-sentencing example shows that judicial emo-
tion can convey compassion and respect, other emotions might
instill motivation. Much of the drug-court model, for example,
is premised on the idea that if the defendant feels that the judge
cares about his future, he will be motivated to change. That
defendant, we hope, will internalize some of the judge’s hopes
for him. Judges also report reciprocal benefits; feeling such
hope, at least from time to time, can make the more difficult
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moments far more bearable. 
The flip side of this coin, of
course, is the danger posed by
judicial emotion. Anger again
provides our primary example.
First, as suggested by the prior
discussion of moods, anger tends
to trigger shallow patterns of
thought, such as reliance on schemas and heuristics. Stereotypes
are a particularly pernicious sort of schema, raising the danger
that when a judge is angry she will be more prone to two-dimen-
sional judgment of litigants, lawyers, or witnesses.45 Of course,
we are most worried about negative stereotypes, like racial bias,
but positive stereotypes, like thinking police officers tend not to
lie, are equally worrisome. The point is that to the angry judge,
people may appear as types rather than as individuals. 
Another shallow thought pattern typical of the angry person
is quick endorsement of information that confirms the initial
anger appraisal. This means that the angry judge is likely to
give potentially important counter-evidence short shrift. Inter-
estingly, angry people tend also to be disproportionately per-
suaded by angry-sounding arguments, regardless of whether
those arguments are actually better.46
Next, anger can lead to decisions that are premature or
overly punitive—or both. The heightened sense of certainty it
brings can make a judge feel confident in the correctness of her
decisions very quickly. That tendency confers an obvious
advantage when further deliberation will be of no utility or
quick action is essential. Judges frequently confront those sit-
uations—for example, a witness may start to testify about
something off-limits and need to get shut down. But the ten-
dency is just as obviously disadvantageous where information-
gathering and reflection would disrupt an unwarranted
assumption or uncover a previously overlooked point. 
A case example illustrates this danger. In a complex civil case,
a district court judge was reversed for having dismissed the
plaintiffs’ case with prejudice as a sanction for discovery abuse.47
The lawyers’ conduct was legitimately infuriating: they played
games, provided misleading information, and evaded discovery
orders. But the judge’s anger eventually took the case down a
bad road. He appeared to become predisposed to interpret every
dispute in the way least favorable to the plaintiffs; possible lies
became clear ones; investigation increasingly seemed futile.
Things finally came to a head in a heated exchange in which a
lawyer addressed the court in a way best described as snarky, and
then suggested that the judge was factually mistaken about the
procedural history of the matter.  When the judge asked whether
the plaintiff had produced certain documents, the lawyer
retorted, “To them?,”  provoking this response:
THE COURT: Well, hell, yes.  Why would you ask a
question like that?  Hell, yes, to the defendant. . . . I kept
telling you to produce stuff. . . . You ducked. You wove.
You did everything to keep from producing them. . . .
Now what the hell do you not understand? You must
produce them. Jesus Christ, I don’t want any more duck-
ing and weaving from you on those 58 documents.
That’s unbelievable. That gives credence to everything I
just heard from the defense. Now, tell me why else you
don’t think that I ought to dismiss this case . . . You bet-
ter tell me. I’m about ready to throw this thing out.
When you tell me that you still haven’t produced those
goddamn 58 documents after four times, four times I’ve
ordered you to produce them. You are abusing this Court
in a bad way. Now tell me.
MR. STARRETT: Well, may I start with the fact—
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. STARRETT: —that you have not ruled four times
to give them those 58 documents—
THE COURT: That’s it. I’m done. I’m granting the
defendant’s motion to dismiss this case for systematic
abuse of the discovery process. Mr. Harris [defense coun-
sel], I direct you to prepare a proposed order with every-
thing you’ve just put on that presentation. I’ll refine it
and slick it up. [Plaintiff’s witness] has abused this court,
has misled you, has lied on his deposition. It’s obvious
he’s lying about that e-mail. This case is gone. . . . What
a disgrace to the legal system. . . . We’re done. We are
done, done, done. What a disgrace. . . . We’re done.
In this exchange, the final straw was counsel’s effort to
explain that not all of the documents in question had been
ordered produced four times. Though tin-eared and poorly
timed, the assertion was basically true. But by that point, the
judge was simply “done.” And once he was “done,” he went
straight to the most punitive response, which left him open to
reversal. 
The point is not in any way to condemn the judge. Indeed,
the appellate court clearly had sympathy for his understand-
ably human reaction, and it probably is safe to say that every
judge could think of at least one situation in which she has
acted similarly. The point, rather, is to demonstrate how even
well-placed anger can create a decisional cascade which, if not
interrupted, may lead to error.
Third, judicial anger can bleed over into other situations.
Being angry at one person for one set of reasons increases the
odds of becoming angry at another person for another set of
reasons, whether that person deserves it or not. This reality
can lead to both misplaced and disproportionate blame. For
example, experimentally induced, utterly irrelevant anger has
been shown in mock-jury studies to correlate with more puni-
tive judgments of tort defendants, as well as with greater levels
of punishment.48
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Fourth, intense judicial anger can manifest in a grossly dis-
proportionate way that can feel literally involuntary. Stated col-
loquially, judges sometimes just lose it. A quick look at the
“benchslap” market—a popular feature on Above the Law—
makes this clear.49 Every major media outlet in the country
reported on a Fifth Circuit oral argument in which Chief Judge
Edith Jones slammed her hand on the bench and told a fellow
judge to “shut up.”50 Just as much media coverage descended
on the Wisconsin Supreme Court when one Justice was
accused of choking another during a testy exchange in cham-
bers.51 A top-trending video on YouTube (inelegantly but accu-
rately called “Flipping the Bird to the Judge”) showed a judge
at video arraignment coming down hard on a young defendant
who disrespected him (he later reversed the sanctions when
she apologized and explained she had been on drugs at the
time).52 Type “angry judge” into the YouTube search engine
and you will find an astonishing array of videos showing
judges screaming, throwing things, even pulling out guns.
From a judge’s perspective, one of the biggest downsides of los-
ing it is that suddenly you are the story.53
Finally, there is reason for judges to worry about the height-
ened sense of power that anger can engender. Because judges
have actual power over actual people, we might well worry
that anger could help a judge feel justified in acting like an
“absolute monarch,”54 or like “God in my courtroom.”55
If the previously described cluster of anger attributes is nec-
essary to judging, this cluster seems anathema to it. Other emo-
tions have evident downsides as well. Contempt, in particular,
presents clear dangers. Contempt is much like anger but with
one crucial difference. When we feel contempt for someone we
are judging them to be our inferior, not just hierarchically but
as a human being.56 For this reason it often is considered to be
a mixture of anger and disgust. Contempt would appear to
underlie the unfortunate insults judges sometimes lob at sen-
tencing, such as “animal,” “lowlife,” or “scumbag.”57 Because a
judge has no claim to superiority but only to authority, con-
tempt is likely unsuitable in nearly every instance.
And now we find ourselves
on the horns of a dilemma.
Judicial emotion giveth and it
taketh away. Anger, our recur-
rent example, is necessary to
critical aspects of judging, but
it simultaneously has tenden-
cies that can impair judging.
The same would appear likely
to hold true for most emo-
tions, though some will tend
generally to be more positive
(one nomination: compas-
sion) or negative (one nomi-
nation: contempt). We there-
fore are a juncture at which
judges need to call upon emotion regulation. 
JUDICIAL EMOTION REGULATION 
In the psychological literature, emotion regulation refers to
any attempt to influence what emotions we have, when we
have them, and how those emotions are experienced or
expressed. Regulation typically entails changing the emotion-
eliciting situation, changing your thoughts about that situa-
tion, or changing your responses to that situation.58
These are processes in which we all regularly engage,
including when at work. How we do so is heavily influenced
by professional norms: flight attendants and bill collectors, for
example, have to meet very different expectations as to how
they feel and display emotion.59 The ideal of dispassion sup-
plies the background professional norm for judges. When
judges report trying to act professionally, they are somehow
engaging in emotion regulation in an attempt to experience
and project neutrality. As the prior discussion revealed, not
only is this not always a good goal, it is an unrealistic one. It’s
particularly unrealistic to expect judges to pull off this feat
with precisely no guidance as to how. Justice Sotomayor stated
Court Review - Volume 49 107
[E]motion 
regulation refers
to any attempt to
influence what
emotions we
have, when we
have them, or
how those 
emotions are
experienced or
expressed.
with confidence that a good
judge simply puts her emotions
aside. Would that it were so easy.
The good news is that while
judicial emotion regulation may
not ever be easy, everyone can get
better at it, and its processes need
not remain a mystery. The first
step certainly is self-awareness, or
what Justice Sotomayor referred
to as recognizing your emotions.
The second step—about which we’ve displayed a remarkable
collective silence—is to engage appropriate emotion-regulation
techniques. Fortunately, that is something about which contem-
porary psychological research has a lot to say.
Such research shows that emotion regulation may be pur-
sued by way of a diverse array of strategies, each with distinct
costs and benefits. There is no such thing as a “good” or “bad”
strategy: all have both occasional utility and maladaptive man-
ifestations. However, some emotion regulation strategies tend
more toward particular types of costs and benefits, not to men-
tion paradoxical or unintended effects, and thus tend to be
more or less well suited to particular contexts. 
In the judging context, the ideal of dispassion has both
obscured that necessary level of analysis and pushed judges
toward strategies that tend to be maladaptive. Just because
generations of judges may have handled emotion in a particu-
lar way—by, say, ignoring it—doesn’t make the approach effec-
tive. Poor regulatory choices can be remarkably impervious to
correction through experience. 
The most critical regulatory capacities for a judge, therefore,
are sensitivity to her own experience, a deep bench of strategic
options, and context-driven flexibility in how those options are
employed. This combination allows her to exert far greater con-
trol over her emotions and how she chooses to express them.
Calling on the research literature illuminates which emotion-
regulation strategies are unlikely to be helpful, are most likely to
be harmful, and are most likely to be productive for judges. 
Unlikely to be helpful: avoidance. One very common regu-
lation strategy is avoidance. Avoidance comes in several differ-
ent flavors. You can simply avoid situations because of their
anticipated emotional effect; if that is not possible, you might
try to modify the situation to alter its emotional salience; and
if that is not possible, you might actively distract yourself.
Imagine that you have a contentious relationship with your
father-in-law, with whom you have to attend a big family din-
ner, and you know that talking with him always makes you
angry. You might arrange in advance to be seated far away from
him at dinner; if that is not socially acceptable, you might
arrange for someone you like to be seated on your other side
and engage that person in conversation whenever possible;
and if you do have to talk with your father-in-law, you might
pretend to listen while mentally going over your upcoming
week’s schedule. Such avoidance techniques are terrifically
helpful in regular life. If you avoid or significantly block out
the emotion trigger, you never have an emotion to deal with. 
Unfortunately, this strategy is very seldom appropriate for
judges. Judges’ ability to choose the emotional situations to
which they are exposed is extremely limited. Not only do you
not choose your cases, but often you can’t even choose your
court or the subject matter of your docket. This is, to be sure,
sometimes possible: a judge who finds family court intolerably
stressful might try to switch to a commercial docket, or a state-
court judge might seek appointment to the federal bench
because it will entail more variety and less exposure to violent
crime. But no matter the court or its jurisdictional parameters,
you can’t control who comes in the door, and you are guaran-
teed cases that will over time cover the emotional spectrum. A
judge can (and generally must) recuse herself from a specific
case if she has direct emotional involvement, such as a close
personal connection to a party. Otherwise, avoiding unwanted
emotion generally will not justify recusal unless it is so
extreme as to pose a serious threat to fundamental fairness.60
Nor can judges always modify situations in a meaningful
way. Again, it is possible on the margins. You can delegate talk-
ing with an irritating lawyer to a clerk, or call breaks, or limit
argument time, or otherwise tinker around with details to buy
some time and relief. These small tweaks can be enormously
helpful. The big emotion triggers, however, often can’t be
worked around. This is so for two primary reasons. 
First, part of the judge’s job is to orchestrate the exposure
that other people have to those triggers. If, for example, you
are deciding under the applicable rules of evidence whether to
withhold autopsy photos from the jury because you worry that
their emotional impact will outweigh informational value, you
need to look at them yourself. Indeed, you need to both have
and notice your own reaction, so it can serve as a rough barom-
eter to what could be expected from the jury. By helping other
people avoid triggers, you must face them yourself. Second, it
is often the most emotionally vivid aspects of a case that
demand your most careful attention. At criminal sentencing,
or when setting damages in tort and mass-disaster cases, you
must take close account of the precise harms caused. Even
with lower-impact emotional triggers, like a particularly inept
argument by a borderline-incompetent attorney, it is not pro-
fessionally acceptable to literally tune out (tempting though it
might be), as something important might happen. This relates
to another point raised elsewhere in this special issue: judicial
multi-tasking, which is one way of distracting yourself, has
consequences. Not surprisingly, distracted people demonstrate
impoverished recall of the situations from which they are dis-
tracting themselves—that’s the point, after all.61
Avoidance therefore is available to judges only in a marginal
way—ironically, because it works too well. It helps judges han-
dle emotional challenges only by helping them disengage from
what it is about the job that makes it emotionally challenging. 
Most likely to be harmful: experiential suppression and
denial. The strategy that is most obviously harmful for judges
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is to try to suppress emotion directly. Think of this as vowing
as a matter of willpower not to feel what you do not wish to,
or pretending—to yourself and others—that you are not feel-
ing it. A California state judge, for example, once described his
approach thus: “I’m not moved by emotion one way or the
other. I’m just kind of like an iceberg, but there is no heating.
I’m just here.”62
The first problem with this strategy is that it does not
achieve its intended purpose. (In the universe of problems,
that is a pretty big one to have.) Attempts to suppress emo-
tional experience or thoughts of an emotional event have not
been shown to have any meaningful effect on the emotions
themselves. In fact, suppression raises the danger of “ironic
rebound.”63 Think of a rough parallel to the “don’t-think-of-a-
pink-elephant” phenomenon, in which the more you try not to
think of something the more you think of it.64 Research shows
that we are somewhat better at suppressing emotions than
other sorts of thoughts, but that is a relative, not absolute,
facility. Emotional suppression can be followed by a counter-
productive increase in the frequency and intrusiveness of emo-
tional thoughts. Suppression also increases the physiological
concomitants of the undesired emotion, such as elevated heart
rate and sweating. It may give the illusion of calming the mind,
but it does not calm the body. 
These rebound and reactivity effects are especially pro-
nounced when a person is under conditions of stress and cog-
nitive load, which describes most moments in a judge’s work-
ing life. Adding denial to the mix tends to make matters worse,
because combining greater physical reactivity with conscious
disavowal of its source is dangerous. It creates a reaction in
search of a cause, meaning a person can easily latch onto an
unrelated, and sometimes innocent, target. The combination
has also been associated with impulsive decision making.65
Further, suppression and denial are highly effortful. Because
of the internal resources they consume, these strategies impair
memory, are associated with impaired performance on logical
tasks, and lead to overly simplistic judgments. 
Finally, these strategies take a toll on the judges who use
them. People who regularly suppress and deny emotion can
develop what psychologists call a “repressive coping style.”66
That style is characterized by (among other things) rigidity
and arrogance, two qualities we clearly would like to discour-
age. Indeed, those qualities have unique potential to erode the
public’s perception of the judiciary.67 People who habitually
repress emotion also are far less able to handle emotion when
they do experience it. One cau-
tionary tale may be found in a
Florida Supreme Court deci-
sion removing a trial judge
from the bench.68 He repeat-
edly treated litigants and
lawyers in a callous, rude, con-
descending, and abusive man-
ner. His own psychiatrist testi-
fied that a repressive anger-
management style had come to
define the judge’s personality,
such that he was in a constant
state of “emotional over-control” that left him unable to
“incorporate emotions into his life.” Instead, he displayed an
utter lack of empathy and periodically exploded. Finally, a
repressive coping style is associated with poor health out-
comes, such as anxiety, hypertension, and coronary heart dis-
ease.69
Caveats about the occasional utility of all regulatory strate-
gies notwithstanding, it is hard to say much good about emo-
tional suppression and denial. The best that can be said is that
a judge might sometimes have no choice but to use them in
extraordinary situations where the emotion threatens to over-
whelm the judge, there is no way to alter the situation, and a
temporary effort to completely ignore the reaction is the only
way to act in a professionally necessary manner. One can imag-
ine such situations. A judge who finds herself forced into that
position, though, will be much better off if she recognizes it for
what it is and gives herself time and space to cope with that
emotion after the crisis is over. 
Often necessary, but comes at a cost: behavioral suppres-
sion. Fortunately, emotion is not the only thing a judge can
suppress. Another common strategy is to suppress only its
external manifestation. Behavioral suppression involves inhibi-
tion of facial expressions (e.g., grimacing), verbalizations (e.g.,
groaning), or bodily movement (e.g., cringing). One masks the
true emotional state with an expression reflecting either neu-
trality (as with a “poker face”) or a desired one (as with a fake
smile). All judges likely spend a good deal of their time doing
exactly that—and for some very good reasons. However, behav-
ioral suppression takes a toll of its own.
The reasons why a person sometimes needs to hide emotion
are rather obvious, particularly to judges. Selectively displaying
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emotion can be highly strate-
gic. A judge might want to
keep an obnoxious attorney
from knowing he has gotten to
her, so as to discourage the
behavior by refusing the attor-
ney satisfaction. (Conversely,
the judge may believe that a
flash of anger might shut the
behavior down, in which case
she would opt for a controlled
display.) She may need to model calmness and decorum to oth-
ers, such as disruptive family members, which will make her
courtroom management duties easier. She may need to prevent
a jury from perceiving what she thinks of a witness, party, or
attorney so as not to influence the jury’s independent evalua-
tion. She may want to prevent other observers, including the
public, from being able to guess what she thinks, lest it improp-
erly broadcast an outcome. The good news is that inhibiting the
outward signs of emotion is relatively effective, particularly if
you are well practiced in doing so. Judges often can keep oth-
ers from perceiving what they feel.
Unfortunately, behavioral suppression is not very effective
as an internal matter. It, too, is effortful, so it has some nega-
tive effects. Behavioral suppression impairs memory for infor-
mation presented during the suppression period. Other cogni-
tive capacities, like logical reasoning, also suffer.70 Those
effects may not be as pronounced as with suppression and
denial, but they remain significant; indeed, they are equivalent
to those attending avoidance. As stated bluntly to this author
by a prominent scholar, behavioral suppression makes a per-
son temporarily “stupider.” 
Further, keeping an emotion from showing does not keep a
person from feeling it. Again, the profile is less extreme than
with experiential suppression. Controlling your facial and bod-
ily movements generally will blunt, but not eliminate, positive
emotions. Interestingly, it has no such effect for negative ones.
That is, suppressing a smile can make you a bit less happy, but
suppressing a frown is not likely to make you less angry. Judges
tend to be most concerned about displaying emotions such as
sorrow, contempt, disgust, and anger, but it is not at all clear
that behavioral suppression will have any effect on this cluster
of feelings. Finally, suppressing expression does not lessen
emotion’s physiological concomitants, and it may in fact
increase them.
Judges can take some comfort that behavioral suppression is
usually going to work in terms of how you are perceived. How-
ever, it is important to be aware that controlling outward signs
of emotion comes at a cost and is not doing any work in terms
of dealing with the emotion itself.
Most likely to be helpful: cognitive reappraisal and disclo-
sure. Thus far the analysis has looked to one strategy (avoid-
ance) that is seldom available; one (suppression and denial)
that is counterproductive, even dangerous; and one (behav-
ioral suppression) that is often necessary but generally costly
and ineffective. Fortunately, two other strategies have a more
positive profile. If the judge can neither avoid, alter, nor ignore
an emotional situation, she may change how she thinks about
it. She also can choose to enlist the perspectives of others by
selectively disclosing her experiences. This final section takes
up these approaches in turn.
Cognitive reappraisal. Recall that an “appraisal” refers to the
thought structure that underlies any given emotion. A “reap-
praisal” therefore refers to a change in those thoughts, which
then leads naturally to a different emotional response. If, for
example, a person comes to believe that a harm was inflicted
accidentally rather than deliberately or negligently, she has no
more reason to be angry and may instead be simply sad. 
The first way in which judges can leverage the power of
reappraisal is by examining the reasons behind their emotions,
so as to determine whether they represent a correct and appro-
priate response. The judge in the viral YouTube video, for
example, may have reacted much less angrily had he consid-
ered the high probability that the defendant was under the
influence of drugs. Her behavior would have been equally
offensive to decorum, but would not have represented a per-
sonal insult. In contrast, it may be entirely appropriate to be
angry at a defendant who uses sentencing as a forum to insult
and taunt his victims.71 Reasons matter. Self-aware judges can
learn to do quick gut-and-brain checks not only on what they
are feeling, but on why they feel it.
While reappraisal may be engaged in real time, a good deal
of thought realignment can happen during times of reflection.
Consider trying the following exercise. Think about situations
in which people you encounter at work—lawyers, litigants,
witnesses, and colleagues—have made you mad. Any given
judge’s anger triggers will, upon introspection, break into rela-
tively stable categories, such as lying, cheating, abusing others,
disrespect, sloppiness, and so on. Then think about why those
particular things make you angry. Finally, think about whether
those reasons justify anger, taking care to examine why or why
not. In a light-hearted but revealing article reflecting just such
an exercise, a Los Angeles state-court trial judge identified reli-
able triggers for his anger, including “lack of civility,” tardi-
ness, cell phones going off in court, “attorney incompetence,”
and the “herding cats” work of trying to get everyone in the
courtroom at the same time.72 He concluded that he would be
much happier if he let some of those go—for example, by
reminding himself that he is sometimes late, decent people
sometimes forget to turn off their cell phones, and so forth. 
Attorney incompetence, in contrast, is legitimately anger-
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ing. This is an important conclusion to reach, too, but not
because it changes the underlying emotion. Rather, deliber-
ately accepting the underlying thoughts puts the judge at just
enough distance to evaluate her possible responses, and to
choose the most fitting one. The judge in Los Angeles learned
to choose different patterns of response to unprepared or
unskilled attorneys—typically by being direct, courteous, and
brief—by focusing on what was within his power to change.
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski describes engaging in a similar
mental exercise after a prosecutor lied to him about a matter of
consequence. After reflection, he concluded that anger was
precisely the right response, and he therefore chose to name
the prosecutor in a harsh written opinion so as to maximize
the deterrent message.73
The second cognitive appraisal technique that holds great
promise for judges is committing to look at situations through
a professional “lens.” This is best explained with an analogy to
being a doctor. Like judges, doctors regularly encounter stim-
uli that naturally provoke strong emotions, like festering
wounds. An important part of learning to be a doctor is learn-
ing to regard that festering wound as professionally relevant.74
It represents a source of information about what is wrong with
the patient and an opportunity to display professional compe-
tence. The doctor thus learns to regard it without disgust, not
by suppressing disgust but by thinking about the wound in a
way that fails to satisfy the appraisal structure of disgust. 
Judges have their own festering wounds to confront. Some-
times that is literally true—recall the example of the autopsy
photos—but more often it is figuratively true. Courtrooms can
be a theater for much that is broken and disturbing in our
world and how we treat one another. For many judges, the
most effective way of approaching that reality will be, when
possible, to treat vivid stimuli as professionally relevant rather
than personally provocative. Such a precommitment helps the
judge stay focused on specific goals—for example, discerning
the informational value of that autopsy photo, since she is the
only one empowered to make that judgment call. That profes-
sional lens can dissipate the emotional salience of the stimuli.
Judges would likely report that when this works, it works
well. The experimental literature shows that even laypeople
can deliberately call on such a neutral-observer approach—
tellingly, by pretending briefly to be doctors—with good
results. When asked to look at disturbing images as a doctor
would, and to think about them “objectively and analytically
rather than as personally, or
in any way emotionally rele-
vant,” they feel less emotion;
show less emotion; display
enhanced, not diminished,
memory; and show
decreased physiological
reactivity.75
Of course, labs are labs.
What an experimental sub-
ject can pull off for a short
period of time, in a con-
trolled environment, with an anticipated stimulus and
explicit instructions, is instructive. To be pulled off by real
judges in real situations, this species of reappraisal must be
trained and practiced. 
Reappraisal, in sum, is of enormous value to judges because
it asks them to think differently, instead of simply command-
ing them to feel differently.
Disclosure. As the above discussion reveals, some amount of
emotion is inevitable, no matter how skilled a judge is at reg-
ulation. Some situations cannot be avoided; behavioral sup-
pression leaves emotions largely intact. Even cognitive
appraisal has limits, for not every situation can be rethought.
Sometimes the elderly person really did lose her entire life sav-
ings to a fraud, or that parent really did brutally rape his child,
or the defendant really does spit in your face.76 Nor would one
want to rethink every situation. The warm glow that comes
from helping families heal, for example, should be savored for
what it is. And the professional lens sometimes will simply
crack. No judge has truly seen everything, and everyone will
be thrown from time to time, just as doctors are. The only way
to prevent such moments is to become closed off and jaded—
to grow that “rhino skin” feared by the Australian magistrate. 
One highly effective strategy for coping with and learning
from those inevitable emotions is disclosure. Disclosure, also
known in the literature as “social sharing,” is the act of think-
ing and talking about your emotions and the experiences that
triggered them.77 To be productive, it must be selective: a judge
should not, for example, indulge in highly public expressions
of vitriol against a colleague.78 But when done thoughtfully
and with a prosocial motive, judicial disclosure of emotion can
be invaluable.
This is not because social sharing eventually dissipates the
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emotion, as if you were empty-
ing a bag. To the contrary, it
tends to reawaken the emo-
tion, often quite vividly. Chief
Judge Kozinski, for example,
recounted to this author a
story more than four decades
old of his son nearly being run
over, and he reported feeling as
terrified, guilty, and shaken as
if it had happened yesterday. Paradoxically, though, disclosure
is a basic impulse that people overwhelmingly experience as a
net positive. Why? 
First, disclosure enhances self-knowledge. By talking or
writing about emotional experiences, we help create a detailed
internal data bank of those experiences. That data bank allows
us to judge our reactions more coherently and consistently.
This sense of heightened self-knowledge and control can help
us live with emotion more comfortably, for we come to experi-
ence those emotions as an integrated aspect of the self. 
Second, disclosure enlists insight and support from others.
This is particularly true when we share emotional challenges
with people who face similar circumstances. Imagine the exer-
cise proposed earlier, in which you identified persistent anger
triggers. Now imagine showing your list to another judge. That
judge would be well-positioned to help with any necessary
reappraisal by explaining whether and how she believes you
are off base, overreacting, or right on the mark. Your spouse,
friends, and other close confidants can serve a similar func-
tion. Perhaps most importantly, communicating with others
helps us feel understood and supported. Numerous judges
have reported to this author that they wish they could have
this sort of communication with their colleagues but feel ner-
vous about doing so, largely because of stigma. The more
judges were to act on that impulse to disclose, the less stigma-
tized it would become.
Finally, public disclosure of judicial emotion also can be
productive (and would go a long way toward dissolving the
stigma). When the public sees the human underneath the robe,
it has a better understanding of how a judge is doing her job.
Disclosing emotion makes transparent an otherwise hidden
input to judicial decision making and invites evaluation
thereof. As the tears-at-sentencing example showed, the reac-
tion can be quite positive, even enhancing respect for the judi-
ciary. A rather different sort of public disclosure would be to
write about it in an opinion, article, or book. For example,
Chief Judge Kozinski wrote a law review article about a crimi-
nal sentencing that unexpectedly triggered those feelings he
had when he inadvertently placed his son in danger, prompt-
ing him to show the defendant mercy. Once on the table, the
propriety of such a motivation was open for debate.79
Disclosure thus can help judges feel more comfortable with
their emotions, and helps ensure that those emotions influence
decision making in a deliberate, thoughtful, and transparent
way. 
CONCLUSION
Within law, we have inherited some hefty cultural baggage,
weighted down with the belief that a good judge is emotion-
less. This article has unpacked that baggage and suggested that
it is that belief, not emotion, that should be put aside. We need
a new ideal: that of the emotionally intelligent judge. The emo-
tionally intelligent judge is self-aware and is able to think
coherently about her emotions and to be in control of their
expression. She is willing to seek the opinions and support of
others and approaches the emotional challenges of the job with
openness and flexibility.
In attempting to thus shift our ideal, we are not alone. More
than a decade ago pioneers in medical education came to real-
ize that, by acculturating doctors to a similar ideal of dispas-
sion, they inadvertently were training them to suppress and
deny emotion, with bad results. Medical students lost empathy
for patients with each year of training; many showed perfor-
mance-impairing levels of emotional disengagement.80 These
pioneers now are seeking to train medical professionals to
improve their emotion-regulation skills. So far, all results are
positive: among the important findings is that clinical perfor-
mance improves as measures of emotional intelligence rise.81
Even with these advances, the general pattern unfortunately
persists. Describing her recent studies of the impact of emotion
on Canadian oncologists, a health psychologist has empha-
sized the importance to doctors of acknowledging their feel-
ings, especially grief:
Not only do doctors experience grief, but the profes-
sional taboo on the emotion also has negative conse-
quences for the doctors themselves, as well as for the
quality of care they provide. Our study indicated that
grief in the medical context is considered shameful and
unprofessional. Even though participants wrestled with
feelings of grief, they hid them from others because
showing emotion was considered a sign of weakness. . . .
The impact of all this unacknowledged grief was exactly
what we don’t want our doctors to experience: inatten-
tiveness, impatience, irritability, emotional exhaustion
and burnout. . . . Even more distressing, half our partici-
pants reported that their discomfort with their grief over
patient loss could affect their treatment decisions with
subsequent patients. Oncologists are not trained to deal
with their own grief, and they need to be.82
If we were to replace the words “oncologists” and “doctors”
with “judges,” I daresay most judges would nod in recognition.
Whether in medicine or law, cultural baggage this heavy is not
easily shed.
Fortunately, the psychology of emotion has done much of
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the heavy lifting already. There is much we still need to learn
about judicial emotion, but we know more than enough to get
started. Judges can learn to prepare realistically for, and
respond thoughtfully to, the emotions they are bound to feel.
It’s time we integrated those lessons into how we train and sup-
port our judiciary. 
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